DIGITAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NORMATIVE LIMITS OF STATE AUTHORITY: RECONFIGURING THE SOCIAL IN ALGORITHMIC ADMINISTRATION

Digital transformation in public administration is often framed in terms of efficiency, transparency, and institutional modernisation. This paper argues that such an understanding is insufficient. When digital systems are embedded in the implementation of state policy, they do not merely optimise administrative processes but reconfigure the normative structure of the social order. Drawing on Kantian ethics, Rawlsian political liberalism, Habermasian discourse theory, and Jonas’s ethic of responsibility, the paper conceptualises digital governance as part of the basic structure of society and therefore subject to standards of legitimacy. It identifies four structural tensions arising from algorithmically mediated governance: instrumentalisation, structural inequality, diffused responsibility, and the infrastructural transformation of authority. In response, the paper develops four corresponding normative principles: non–instrumentalisation, structural justice, public justifiability, and forward–looking responsibility. These principles do not function as technical prescriptions but as conditions under which digital governance can remain normatively defensible within democratic political order. The analysis contributes to ongoing debates by reframing digital governance as a question of legitimacy rather than technical performance.